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Website: <www.unicef-icdc.org>A Decade of Transition reviews the momentous changes in the 27 countries of Central and Eastern Europe
and the Commonwealth of Independent States since 1989, focusing on the well-being of ordinary people and
their children. It builds on years of authoritative research carried out by UNICEF’s Innocenti Research
Centre, to produce an end-of-decade report on the human face of the transition.
This Report, the eighth from the Centre, is published at a time when the world’s commitment to child-
ren’s survival and development is under close scrutiny. In 1990, world leaders met at the World Summit for
Children to pledge their support to a series of goals to improve child well-being by the year 2000.  This year,
the UN Secretary-General’s review of the progress made reveals a mixture of success and failure. Thanks to
a decade of strenuous efforts, child mortality rates have fallen in many countries. However, millions of child-
ren continue to suffer from poverty, ill health and marginalization.
This global picture certainly reflects the situation in the transition countries, but no other region has
experienced such a root and branch transformation of its social structure, its societies, infrastructure and bor-
ders. Eight countries splintered into 27. Every one of them experienced some kind of economic crisis. In
many, tensions that had been simmering for years erupted into open conflict.
The human impact has been immense. Fundamental freedoms have been recognized in most countries –
the right to vote, to express an opinion, to use one’s own initiative and enterprise, to travel and so on. But
many people have been stranded by a tide of progress that has swept past them.
It is clear that the original goals of the transition – to raise the standard of living for everyone and to
develop humane and democratic societies – now need to be re-affirmed. The economic goals of the transi-
tion should be seen as tools to achieve these greater human goals. In reality, the ultimate success of the tran-
sition will depend on improvements in social conditions and the promotion of human rights, as well as on
economic strength.
We hope that A Decade of Transition will be a useful tool for decision-makers, economists, child rights
campaigners and for children and young people wishing to make a difference. As a record of the progress and
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Contents1 Changing Societies
health, primary education and nutrition and to protect
children against exploitation, violence and abuse.
An emphasis on a broad conception of human devel-
opment was paralleled in the 1990s by an increasing accep-
tance of a broad notion of what constitutes “human rights”.
It is now widely agreed that human rights include a range
of economic, social and cultural rights. On this view, ade-
quate nourishment, housing, health and decent education
are not merely desirable goals, but a basic human right. The
cause of children has acted as an important catalyst here.
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, drafted
in the thawing Cold War era, quickly became the most
widely ratified international human rights instrument to
date. (Box 1.1 provides more information on the
Convention and on the World Summit for Children.)
At first sight, both the human development and human
rights approaches might be presumed to put all the emphasis
for ensuring progress on action by governments. How else, for
example, might the poor gain access to health services and
education? Governments certainly have an essential role to
play in ensuring social progress, but it is far from the case that
either approach views governments as the only positive force
for good. Profit-seeking national and international enter-
prises are key players, too, generating employment, investing
in the skills of their workforces and developing new tech-
nologies that expand human capabilities.
2
The essence of the emerging consensus approach to
development at the start of the 21st century is therefore the
placement of access to education and health in the context
of the right to participate in and contribute to society and
the encouragement of national and foreign investors to help
create opportunities under the eye of an independent media,
civil society and other institutions of a democratic state.
How is the theme of this Report – the changes in
human welfare in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS
during the 1990s – related to these global trends and issues?
In a sense, this region has been testing the new devel-
opment paradigm on the ground. The enhancement of
human rights in all senses, broad and narrow, has been one
of the main aims of the transition, the communist regimes
clearly having denied their citizens some key elements of
those rights. On the other hand, there were many achieve-
ments in the region prior to 1989 that promoted human
development – low poverty and universal access to educa-
tion and basic health services. Hence there was much on
which to build. The development of the private sector and
the integration into the global economy have naturally
This Report reviews the impact of social and economic
transformation on human welfare in the 27 countries of
Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). It is the eighth in a series of
reports that have been produced by the MONEE project at
the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre to monitor the
transition in the region.
Earlier reports have often focused on particular
themes or groups in the population, for example, education
(1998), women (1999) and young people (2000).
However, this year’s report is broad-ranging. It exploits the
fact that data are now available on many issues that cover
the entire 1990s, the first decade in the ongoing transition
process. It looks back at what the 1990s brought across a
range of subjects, including household incomes, health,
education and demography. In each case, the Report sum-
marizes developments up to the end of the decade, dis-
cussing both the outcomes measured with statistical data
and the policy options.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 paved the way for
changes in every aspect of life in this region. New opportu-
nities and new risks emerged for all members of society. The
main drive for change has been bold economic and politi-
cal reform – the transition from planned systems to market
economies and from authoritarian regimes to more partici-
patory societies.
But the 1990s also saw a broader, worldwide transition:
a change in thinking about what constitutes social progress.
This change is well illustrated by the advent of the
United Nations Development Programme’s annual Human
Development Report, first published in 1990. Building on
earlier writers’ work on the definition and measurement of
human welfare, the report presents a “human development
index” that places indicators of health and education out-
comes alongside statistics on GDP.
1 This contrasts with a
view of health and education as being largely only instru-
ments to further material well-being, a view which was
widely held in capitalist and communist countries alike.
The new vision is of the healthy, educated and poverty-free
individual as the ultimate goal of development, and it is a
vision that now has wide acceptance in the international
community.
One reflection of this new approach was the World
Summit for Children held in New York in 1990. The sum-
mit made a global commitment to achieve substantial
improvements in child well-being by the year 2000. This
was backed by a set of goals to enhance child and maternalconditions are hardly conducive to major advances in
broader dimensions of human development. But just as the
level of a country’s development cannot be judged at one
point in time solely by economic output, it would also be
quite wrong to see changes in national income as the only
determining factor for social progress.
On the positive side, there have been many changes
for the better. Some of these are not well measured in a
report such as this which relies heavily on available statis-
tical data. Importantly, there has been a healthy shift away
from dependency on the state and from top-down
approaches that ignore the individual. Initiatives and deci-
sions are no longer made by state planners, but increasingly
by local administrators, members of the community, entre-
preneurs, consumers, or the users of services, citizens.
Hence the way progress has been achieved is promising: it
reflects the fact that the new foundations for human devel-
opment – the market, civil society, democratic institutions
– are in place in an increasing number of countries.
This first chapter provides an introduction to the
region and to some key economic and social changes that
have occurred in the transition to date. These changes set
the context for much of the rest of the Report.
Section 1.1 shows the alterations in the political map
that have escorted the deconstruction of the former com-
munist bloc. It also places countries’ current levels of devel-
opment in an international perspective. Section 1.2 pre-
sents a summary review of the changes in human well-being
during the transition, comparing the values of 20 indicators
in 1989 and 1999. It documents the large falls in many wel-
fare indicators and finds that, typically, social advances and
economic progress have gone hand in hand.
been central to a reform agenda that aims to push the
region’s countries to higher levels of human development.
At the same time, it is arguable that attention has
been over-focused on the economic reforms and on eco-
nomic indicators of the transition’s progress. The MONEE
project’s Regional Monitoring Reports have aimed to help
redress this balance. Social conditions and public policy
relating to them are central to the movement from one sys-
tem of economic and social organization to another, and
their monitoring is vital to the transition.
The 1990s represent only the first period in a con-
tinuing process of economic and social change.
Nevertheless, a decade is sufficient time to see the main
trends clearly and to identify both the advances and the
setbacks that the transition has entailed for different
aspects of human welfare, together with the possibilities for
progress in the future.
Each of the chapters of this Report finds much evi-
dence of adversity during the first decade of transition. There
can be little doubt that these negative aspects of the region’s
transformation have exceeded the fears held at the start of
the process. In part, the setbacks reflect the decline in the
economic strength of the region’s economies, which was a
good deal larger than foreseen. At its lowest point in each
country during the 1990s, measured national income had
fallen by from 13 to 75 percent and on average by over 40
percent. By 1993 only four countries were registering some
economic growth. By 1996 the economies of 21 countries
were growing, and in 2000 all countries but two recorded
growth. However, it is still the case that by the start of 2001
only five countries had surpassed their 1989 levels of GDP.
When countries suffer large falls in national income,
I. CHANGING SOCIETIES
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Two major international commitments to children were
made at the beginning of the 1990s.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child came
into force in September 1990. This international legal
instrument spells out the human rights that children
everywhere have: civil, political, economic, social and cul-
tural rights. The Convention has four general principles:
1. The  right  to  life,  survival  and  development.
Development is interpreted in a broad sense, including
the mental, emotional, cognitive, social and cultural
senses, as well as a physical one.
2. Non-discrimination. Rights should be enjoyed irrespec-
tive of the child’s or his or her parents’ race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic, or social origin, property, disability,
birth, or other status.
3. The best interests of the child must be a primary con-
sideration in all decisions or actions that affect chil-
dren, whether decisions are made by governmental,
administrative, or judicial authorities, or by families.
4. Children should be free to have opinions in all matters
affecting their lives, and their opinions should be given
due weight in accordance with their age and maturity.
All countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the
CIS are signatories to the Convention and hence partici-
pate  in  the  process  of  periodic  reporting  to  the
Committee  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child.  (See
<www.crin.org> for both official and NGO reports on the
Convention’s implementation.)
1990 also saw the World Summit for Children, at
which the world’s leaders set concrete development goals
for children to be achieved by the end of the decade.
During 2001, most countries, including those in Central and
Eastern Europe and the CIS, drafted end-decade reports as
part  of  preparations  for  the  forthcoming  UN  General
Assembly Special Session on Children. (More information
on the goals, together with the end-decade reviews, can
be found at <www.unicef.org/specialsession>.)
3
Box 1.1
Goals and commitments for childrencountries, plus 22 newly independent nations born out of
the Soviet Union in 1990-91, Czechoslovakia in 1993 and
former socialist Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995. The
positive outcomes of these changes may include the stimu-
lus for different cultures and people having a greater sense
of identification with their country. This may mean, for
example, the promotion of a child’s mother tongue in the
classroom and in wider society.
The map for 2001 also indicates the most negative
outcome of the transformation of the region. The symbols
indicating explosions show where there has been signifi-
cant armed conflict, generally resulting from ethnic ten-
sion. These ethnically focused resentments often predated
the communist period. Although open strife was held in
check for several decades under communism, little was
done to resolve the underlying problems.
Since 1988, armed conflict has claimed thousands of
lives. Millions of people have had to flee their homes, and,
even though many of them have since returned, as of
In 1989, over 400 million people were living in Central and
Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries and the
Commonwealth of Independent States. The transition
towards market economies and democratic governments
during the 1990s took place across a vast geographical area
and affected a population of enormous diversity.
Changes in the political map
One of the great promises of the transition has been free-
dom in terms of thought, self-expression and association.
Indeed, one of the major achievements of the 1990s in
many countries was the swift and, for the most part, peace-
ful shift from authoritarian regimes to independent, sover-
eign, functioning democracies.
The significant alterations in political boundaries in
the 1990s are revealed in Figure 1.1, which shows the eight
countries that existed in the region in 1989 and the 27 sov-
ereign states in 2001. The latter include five of the original
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1.1 Political Change and Development Perspectives
Sections 1.3 and 1.4 consider in more detail the
changing economic and demographic pictures, respectively.
Topics covered include changes in national income per
head and in government expenditure, the quality of gov-
ernment and trends in fertility, marriage and divorce. Many
of the changes have been large. These sections reflect the
shifts in the role and nature of institutions – states, markets
and families – that constitute a core of the transition.
The main aim of this first chapter is to provide a
background for the subsequent analysis in the Report rather
than to attempt a verdict on the whole transition process.
But some conclusions for the future direction of the region
certainly do emerge, and these are given in Section 1.5.
The four chapters that follow bring the reader close
to the problems with which individual people and families
have had to cope during the transition and which policy-
makers have had to confront. These are intended to pro-
vide a summary of the changes in well-being for the popu-
lation as whole, but, as is natural for a report from an orga-
nization concerned with child welfare, there is a strong
emphasis on the position of children.
Chapter 2 describes shifts in income inequality dur-
ing the 1990s and analyses poverty at the end of the decade.
Transition has brought large changes not only in the over-
all size of the national cake, but also in the way the cake is
divided up. The analysis of poverty in the chapter is focused
firmly on poverty among children, as is the discussion of
policies to combat poverty.
Chapter 3 looks at health issues. It first documents a
variety of disturbing trends in health outcomes, as reflected
in adult mortality and the incidence of infectious diseases.
Special attention is given to HIV/AIDS. The chapter then
turns to health status over the life cycle, focusing on chil-
dren, young people and women. Growing inequalities in
health access and outcomes are then reviewed. The chap-
ter finishes with a discussion of key issues in policy for
health systems in the region.
Chapter 4 considers changes in education. This chap-
ter has a firm focus on children and young people, although
the implications of changes in education are of immense
relevance for all groups in society. Enrolment rates and out-
comes in terms of learning and labour market success are
analysed; inequalities in access to education are discussed;
shifts in government and households’ expenditure on edu-
cation are explored, and the decentralization of school
finance and governance is assessed.
Chapter 5 focuses on a particularly vulnerable group
in the population: children deprived of a family upbringing.
It documents the phenomenon of the institutionalization
of children (a serious problem in the communist period),
including the shifts that occurred during the 1990s, which,
despite some improvements, were too often for the worse.
The reasons why children enter public care are analysed,
and alternatives to institutionalization are discussed.
These chapters do not cover all aspects of the social
conditions during the transition. However, they offer con-
crete analyses in several key areas of human well-being and
illustrate the complexity and extent of the transformation
which the 1990s brought about. Taken together, they aim
to force attention on the needs of the region’s children and
adults and the role of various agents in meeting these needs
– issues calling for more discussion and dialogue as the tran-
sition continues to unfold.
 December 2000 there were 2.2 million people still regis-
tered as internally displaced within their countries, and
985,000 people were living as refugees in foreign countries
(see Box 1.2).
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Refugees and internally displaced persons often expe-
rience loss of property and harsh living conditions in collec-
tive centres. They risk treatment as second class citizens.
Children are particularly hard hit by armed conflict. The
consequences for them include disruption of schooling,
poverty, stress and exposure to war trauma and loss of family.
Even when conflict has ended, the devastating effects
can continue through poor job prospects and shattered
social infrastructure, including housing and schools.
Ongoing instability depresses the economy, turns potential








Note: The explosion symbols indicate where armed conflict has occurred. EU applicants are shown in a darker shade. The publication of these maps does not imply on the part of UNICEF the expression of any
opinion concerning the legal status of any country, its authorities, or its frontiers.The region in a development perspective
If one considers only economic wealth, the division
between East and West seems enormous. Figure 1.2 illus-
trates the disparity in economic capacity by ranking 41
countries in Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe
and the CIS by national income per capita. The blue
columns show GDP per person expressed in US dollars at
market exchange rates. This measure represents the coun-
tries’ economic power when valued using an exchange rate
appropriate to international trade. Norway, the richest
country shown in the diagram, has a per capita income over
180 times that of Tajikistan, the poorest country.
The grey columns measure GDP expressed in “pur-
chasing power parity” (PPP) dollars. These figures show, on
a comparable basis, what national income is worth in terms
of what it would buy in the domestic market. This measure
reflects differences in the standard of living among coun-
tries better than does income at market exchange rates. Its
use reduces somewhat the differences between East and
West. For example, the difference between German and
As history has unfortunately shown, overcoming age-
old distrusts among people and nations takes time.
Economic integration among countries, matched with
respect for cultural identity and sincere dialogue, can be
effective in uprooting the underlying causes of tension. In
this light, the other dimension of political change noted in
the map for 2001 in Figure 1.1 – the eventual accession of
up to 10 countries in the region to the European Union
(EU) – has the potential to increase considerably the secu-
rity and political stability of the whole region (although it
is the case that armed conflict has been concentrated out-
side the EU applicants).
Four of the 10 countries which are official applicants
to the EU have joined the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD): the Czech
Republic (1995), Poland and Hungary (1996) and Slovakia
(2000). All the countries in the region, except Belarus and
four Central Asian republics, have become members (or
“special guests”, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR
Yugoslavia) of the Council of Europe, which aims to sup-
port stability, democracy and legislative reform.
6
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Armed conflict has broken out in around one-third of
the 27 transition countries since 1989.
5
Armenia  and  Azerbaijan,  1988-94. Clashes
between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops led to a
bloody war over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh,
which was still part of the Soviet Union when the unrest
first became significant. About one million people were
uprooted from their homes.
Central  Asia:  the  Ferghana  Valley,  1989-91.
Tensions escalated in 1989 in the Ferghana Valley, which
straddles the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, and a series of violent outbreaks resulted
in hundreds of deaths and extensive damage to prop-
erty. While violent conflict has been rare since that time,
continuing tensions are seen as a risk.
Georgia, 1990-94. Fighting began in South Ossetia
in the north of the country in late 1990, forcing an esti-
mated 50,000-90,000 people to flee. A short time later,
hundreds of thousands of people were uprooted by the
conflict in Abkhazia. The situation began to stabilize in
1994, although a political settlement remains elusive.
Moldova,  1992. A short  but  intense  conflict
between  the  government  and  the  self-proclaimed
“Dnestr Republic” began and ended in 1992.
Tajikistan, 1992-93. A civil war beginning in 1992
left an estimated 50,000 dead and up to 700,000 peo-
ple displaced. National reconciliation began in 1994,
and by the time of the peace agreement in 1997 most
of the displaced had returned to their homes, many of
which had been destroyed.
The Russian Federation: Northern Caucasus, 1992-
2001. A brief but intense outburst of violence between
North Ossetia and Ingushetia occurred in October 1992.
1994 saw federal troops enter Chechnya, which had
declared independence. Following two major periods of
fighting, there are now an estimated 160,000 internally
displaced people in neighbouring Ingushetia. Those
who remain in Chechnya face harsh living conditions
and continuing violence.
Former  Yugoslavia,  1991-95. In  1991  Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence
from the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Sporadic violence erupted into war, first in Croatia then in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which became the site of the region’s
bloodiest conflict. The war added a new expression to the
international vocabulary: “ethnic cleansing” – the blatant
targeting of civilian populations because of their ethnicity.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1997-99. Tensions
in Kosovo led gradually to a guerrilla war and a major
military operation in early 1999. Hundreds of thousands
of Kosovar refugees fled to Albania, FYR Macedonia and
other countries. Following a NATO bombing campaign
and the withdrawal of federal troops, many Kosovars
returned to the province, and an estimated 150,000
Serbian refugees fled to Yugoslavia.
FYR  Macedonia,  2001.  The  Former  Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia managed to avoid bloodshed
throughout the turbulent 1990s, but clashes between
guerrillas and army troops near its border with the
province of Kosovo in early 2001 have spread. According
to the Macedonian Red Cross, by the end of June over
35,000 people had been registered as displaced.
Box 1.2
Armed conflicts in the southern parts of the regionRussian incomes drops from a factor of almost 14 when a
market exchange rate is used to one of only about four.
The diagram also highlights significant differences
within Western Europe and within the transition countries;
average incomes in Portugal and Spain appear to be closer
to those in the Czech Republic or Hungary than to those
in Norway or Denmark, while, on the PPP basis, Slovenia
overtakes EU-member Greece.
Figure 1.3 offers a broader perspective on countries’
levels of development. It shows the 1999 rankings for 25 of
the transition countries in an international field of 162
nations, as published in the 2001 Human Development
Report. The basis of the ranking is the performance of coun-
tries according to UNDP’s Human Development Index
(HDI), which considers development in broader terms than
merely the level of national income, as noted in the intro-
duction to this chapter.
The blue bars show how far (in terms of places in the
ranking) each country falls
behind the best performing
country; that is, the longer
the bar, the lower a country’s
standing. One message from
the graph is the huge dispar-
ity across the region. Rather
than being close to each
other, countries run from
29th position (Slovenia) to
103rd (Tajikistan). (There
are hence 49 countries from
other parts of the world
mixed in the ranking among
the transition countries.)
How much is this dis-
parity in the human develop-
ment of countries the out-
come of the transition, and
hence how did the position of
countries change during the
1990s? Unfortunately, a com-
parison of HDI scores over
the 1990s is not straightfor-
ward because there were con-
siderable changes in the data
and the methods of calcula-
tion used, rendering changes
I. CHANGING SOCIETIES
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GDP in purchasing power parities























































































































































Report 2001, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Note: The HDI is an unweighted average of a country’s scores by an income indicator (per capita GDP expressed in purchasing power pari ty terms) and two
“human capability” measures: health and education (measured, respectively, by life expectancy and by a composite index of school enrolments and literacy).sition countries up 10-15 places with respect to their HDI
ranking in the mid-1990s.
Figure 1.4 offers a similar conclusion using a child-
related indicator. For 140 countries, it shows the relation-
ship between economic output and the probability that a
child will not survive to age 5, a key summary indicator of
child well-being. (Lower rates of under-5 mortality are gen-
erally associated with better child and maternal nutrition
and better access to basic social services, including health
and education.) The higher a country’s GDP, the lower its
under-5 mortality rate. But as the blue diamonds indicate,
the post-communist countries tend to be outliers with lower
under-5 mortality rates than those of other countries with
comparable levels of income.
This advantage of the transition countries in terms of
health, education and gender equity is an important one. It
is important both for the development of individuals
through childhood and into adulthood and for the future
progress of countries. It will be vital to maintain and build
on this record as economic recovery continues.
But is the comparative advantage of the transition
countries in social terms a real one? Would not a rigorous
test scale back the apparent social achievements – similar
to the verdict world markets delivered in the 1990s on parts
of the region’s supposed past economic attainments?
Certainly, some achievements were merely formal.
One example is the high share of women in the toothless
parliaments that existed prior to 1989, shares that collapsed
in the 1990s once parliaments obtained real power (see the
1999 Regional Monitoring Report).
In other cases, measurement issues blur the picture.
Migration, changes in state borders and weaker vital regis-
tration have added confusion to population figures since
1989-90, when, often, the last censuses were taken. The
efforts of statistical agencies to carry out new censuses and
social surveys have not always received the necessary sup-
port. Imprecise population figures affect the accuracy of
over time ambiguous. The ranking is
also affected by shifts in the number of
countries included. Using 1985-90
data, the 1991 Human Development
Report ranked Czechoslovakia 27th,
Hungary 30th, the USSR 31st,
Yugoslavia 34th, Poland 41st and
Romania 58th.
In one sense, therefore, it is
clearly difficult to talk about Central
and Eastern Europe and the CIS as an
homogenous region. However, several
other regions also display a wide range
of human development rankings. Latin
America, for example, shows a similar
spread in ranks on the basis of 1999
HDI values: between 34 and 108
(Argentina and Guatemala, respec-
tively). Moreover, the transition coun-
tries do indeed have several structural and institutional
characteristics in common.
One shared feature is clearly the market and democ-
racy-oriented thrust of reform in the region. Another
common feature can be illustrated through Figure 1.3. If
one focuses only on the economic component of the HDI,
most transition countries drop in the international rank-
ing, as shown by the difference between the blue and the
grey bars, the latter giving the ranks for GDP per capita in
PPP terms. This implies that the region enjoys a compar-
ative advantage in terms of the development of human
capabilities, such as health and education. On the GDP-
per-capita measure, 116 countries do better than
Armenia, for example. However, if social sector perfor-
mance is also taken into account by using the HDI rank-
ing, Armenia jumps 44 countries which are richer in
income terms (including Morocco, Bolivia, South Africa,
Turkey and Peru) to arrive at 72nd place. The diagram
also shows that this comparative edge in social terms is
more significant among the economically less developed
countries in the region.
For two countries, however, the international stand-
ing fails to improve in the switch from the ranking by GDP
to that by the HDI: Russia and Kazakhstan. One reason for
this is that both countries have experienced large rises in
adult male mortality during the transition, which reduces
life expectancy – one element in the HDI. (Chapter 3
describes how Russia and Kazakhstan now have the lowest
values of life expectancy in the region.)
In analysing the issue further, the 1999 Regional
Monitoring Report, “Women in Transition”, concluded that
the transition countries also possess a relative advantage in
terms of gender equality, which has important implications
for child development. The Report found that a ranking
using the UNDP’s gender-related development index (a
refined HDI that considers gender disparities in earned
income, life expectancy and schooling) moved all the tran-



































































UNDP (2001), op. cit.:
see Figure 1.3.
Note: The mortality data refer to 1995 for Tajikistan, 1996 for Albania and 1998 for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The line on the diagram rep-
resents the regression of log child mortality on log GDP per capita.
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Box 1.3 offers an historical perspective by comparing
progress in the reduction of infant mortality in four coun-
tries. The evidence shows that much of the early advances
of the communist countries relative to other industrialized
countries was lost during the 1970s and 80s. This suggests
two possible scenarios: one whereby the transition helps
countries close the gap with the most advanced nations in
the world and one whereby transition-related problems
eliminate the remnants of the comparative advantage of
the region. This second scenario would be consistent with
economic reform taking priority over social issues in the
political agenda.
 
many indicators, including per capita GDP and education
enrolment rates (both considered in the HDI). A compar-
ison of administrative sources and household survey data on
infant mortality suggests that the former may give figures
that are too low in some countries (see Chapter 3). (Infant
mortality accounts for much of the under-5 mortality
shown in Figure 1.4.) Several countries still use a concept
of “live birth” that is slightly different from the standard
international definition, with the result that infant mortal-
ity is underestimated by 10-20 percent. Caution in using
data is therefore often justified.
Nevertheless, it does appear that the transition coun-
tries have accumulated significant social gains over the last
I. CHANGING SOCIETIES
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In the post-war period, the communist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe achieved some remarkable
progress in reducing poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and
the incidence of infectious diseases. Much of this was
reflected in a rise in women’s status in society and
improvements in the survival chances of children.
Figure 1.5 illustrates this early progress by com-
paring the ways in which infant mortality rates fell in
four countries: Russia and the Czech Republic on the
one hand and the UK and Chile on the other. (Infant
mortality rates measure the incidence of death in the
first year of life.)
Infant mortality fell rapidly during the 1950s in
both Russia and the Czech Republic. In the early 1960s,
the Czech infant mortality rate was comparable to that
in the UK, and the Russian rate was not far behind. But
infant  mortality  then  stagnated  both  in  the  Czech
Republic and, during the 1970s, in Russia, while the UK
continued to make progress.
In Chile in 1950, almost 160 in every 1,000 children
born did not survive to age 1 – a far higher mortality rate
than that in Russia or the Czech Republic at the time.
Infant mortality in Chile declined slowly in the 1950s and
60s and then very rapidly during the 70s, to the point
where it fell below the Russian rate in the mid-80s. As in
the other countries, infant mortality in Chile fell as a
result of improved living standards and also because of
highly targeted investment in maternal and child health.
7
The story of the two transition countries was very
different in the 1990s. After an initial blip, the Czech
Republic finally succeeded in closing the gap with the
UK, while Russian infant mortality remained higher.
Hence the gap between Russia and the other three
countries grew.
Box 1.3

































































project database.example). And some indicators may show large year-to-
year variation in smaller countries, such as maternal mor-
tality, with the result that the values for neither 1989, nor
1999 are a fully reliable guide to conditions at the end of
the two decades concerned.
Read horizontally, the table shows how countries dif-
fer in their performance on a given indicator. Read verti-
cally, the table offers a review of the achievements of each
of the 27 countries, and the last line (above the memoran-
dum items) summarizes country performance in terms of
the percentage of indicators (for which there is informa-
tion) that show improvement.
Of the 507 cells in the table where there are data
present, 271 – 53 percent – have numbers in black, imply-
ing a deterioration in welfare in 1999 compared to 1989.
In most countries, more indicators show a fall in welfare
than show a rise.
The achievements of different countries
The variation by country is striking. It is clear that the
Central European countries – the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary and Poland – have better records.
There, two-thirds to three-quarters of indicators show
improvements. Since these countries have been pioneers
in implementing economic and political change, the mes-
sage is that successful reform is associated with social
progress. This may represent cause and effect. For example,
economic reform that leads to GDP growth will result in
higher average incomes and should generate more govern-
ment resources for spending on health and education sys-
tems. Alternatively, progress in education and health may
help economic and political reform. Or the association
may reflect some common factor that results in progress on
all fronts.
The picture for much of former Yugoslavia is also rel-
atively favourable. There are as many improvements for
Slovenia and Croatia as there are for the Czech Republic
or Hungary. FYR Macedonia, one of the poorest post-
Yugoslav states, does surprisingly well. Although FR
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) posts one of the
largest falls in measured GDP, many social indicators
appear little affected. (In many ways, FR Yugoslavia started
the transition only very recently.) There are not enough
data to make a summary comparison for Bosnia-
Herzegovina, but the memorandum item on population
change (-17 percent) is indicative of the devastating war
there in the mid-1990s.
Of the remaining 18 countries, all show fewer
improvements in social indicators, including Albania,
Bulgaria and Romania in South-Eastern Europe and the
three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Albania
was and still is the poorest country in Europe and was hit
Where countries stand in international comparisons of liv-
ing standards at a point in time is certainly of interest, but
what matters most to people living in each country is
whether there are improvements over time in their condi-
tions of life.
Table 1.1 attempts to summarize shifts in living stan-
dards in the region during the 1990s with 20 indicators that
reflect different aspects of well-being, including incomes,
health, education and child protection. In each case the table
shows the change in the indicator between 1989 and 1999.
(Changes are shown either in absolute terms, or in percent
terms.) The table headings group the countries into the seven
geographical sub-regions used in the Regional Monitoring
Reports: Central Europe, former Yugoslavia, the other coun-
tries of South-Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, western CIS,
the Caucasus and Central Asia (including Kazakhstan).
As noted in the previous section, by no means all
facets of life in the region are quantifiable with statistical
data, and several dimensions in which there have been
clear improvements are not covered in the table, for exam-
ple political freedom. Nevertheless, many aspects of living
standards can be successfully measured.
Each of the indicators has been chosen on the basis
that it can be interpreted as a “welfare indicator” so that a
rise or a fall has an unambiguous meaning. Numbers given
in blue show where welfare has improved. The criterion
that change can be interpreted as a change in welfare leads
to the exclusion of several indicators where the implica-
tions of rises or falls are unclear. The birth rate is in this cat-
egory, although the change in the birth rate is included for
information as a “memorandum item” at the foot of the
table along with the change in population. The percentage
of children born outside marriage would be another exam-
ple. These measures of demographic change are discussed
further in Section 1.4.
8
The actual selection of indicators represents a com-
promise between relevance to individual well-being and
the availability of data. About half the indicators refer to
children or young people, including all those for education.
Nine of the 20 refer to health or mortality, reflecting in part
the relative abundance of information on these subjects.
There are only three indicators of economic well-being,
GDP per capita, the real wage and employment; a direct
measure of poverty is therefore missing. The indicators are
listed in descending rank-order according to the number of
countries that show an improvement over time, the figures for
which are given in the final column.
It is important to bear in mind that the table com-
pares two years only, 1989 and 1999, and does not summa-
rize the experience of the 1990s as a whole. A sharp dete-
rioration in an indicator in the early 1990s will not be
revealed if there was a recovery by the end of the decade (as
was the case for male life expectancy in Lithuania, for
REGIONAL MONITORING REPORT No. 8 - 2001
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1.2 Social and Economic Change during the TransitionI. CHANGING SOCIETIES
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20 indicators of welfare change, 1989 to 1999
IMR (per 1,000 live births)
a 1 -5.4 -5.2 -10.2 -7.3 -3.6 -4.0 -21.8 -8.3 -15.3 -10.4 0.2
Teenage birth rate 
(per 1,000 female population 15-19)
b 1 -29.6 -21.2 -13.4 -17.0 -19.3 -13.4 -22.2 -15.7 -16.3 0.4 -26.0
Abortion rate (per 100 births)
c 1 -40.3 -24.8 -14.5 -2.2 -18.1 -66.4 -53.7 -81.7 1.9 -17.4
Higher education enrolment 
(% of population 19-24)
d 1 9.4 9.1 26.7 16.8 27.9 8.6 0.4 4.9 5.7 12.7
Maternal mortality rate 
(per 100,000 live births)
e 1 -2.8 1.5 -6.4 -12.9 13.7 6.0 -8.7 -3.5 -18.9 -0.2
Youth mortality rate 
(per 100,000 population 15-24)
f 2 -4.9 -9.4 -16.0 -31.5 -26.1 -11.6 3.8 -19.0 -4.2 23.6 -11.0
Life expectancy, females (years)
g 1 2.7 1.8 2.0 1.3 2.1 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.9 -0.3
Life expectancy, males (years)
g 1 3.3 2.2 2.1 0.9 2.6 0.3 0.3 1.1 2.1 -0.7
Pre-primary education enrolment 
(% of relevant population)
h 1 4.2 -8.3 1.2 1.6 14.6 4.4 1.9 5.3 -14.8 -0.2
Sexually transmitted diseases 
(per 100,000 population)
i 1 -44.9 -24.0 -22.5 -29.6 4.3 -9.6 -3.6 7.1 -6.1
Adolescent suicide 
(per 100,000 population 15-19)
j 1 2.3 -0.9 2.2 -2.9 1.4 -0.9 0.6 -2.8
Tuberculosis incidence 
(per 100,000 population)
k 1 -3.3 -4.8 -11.1 2.9 -10.5 -21.1 -13.9 -15.7 -1.9 19.5
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages)
l 1 5.6 12.6 0.7 19.0 4.8 -2.9 1.6 2.8 -3.2 -1.7 7.5
Registered juvenile crimes (number)
m 2 9.0 53.2 31.5 19.4 54.0 -12.1 88.0 -46.0 128.4
Upper secondary education enrolment 
(% of population 15-18)
n 1 -3.3 1.0 11.0 28.3 12.8 11.4 -37.0 -2.6
Infant home placement 
(per 100,000 population 0-3)
o 2 7.0 44.0 6.7 -23.3 -41.6 23.4 52.1 22.1 11.6 43.1
Graduation from basic education 
(per 100 population aged 15)
p 1 0.7 2.4 -0.8 2.0 -2.6 -20.3 -6.2
GDP per capita
q 2 -3.8 -1.8 19.7 3.4 9.7 -18.7 -31.2 -59.1 -9.2 -27.6
Real wage
r 2 7.1 -13.9 9.9 -19.0 -10.6 -47.0 -8.0 -47.8
Employment ratio 
(employment per population 15-59)
s 1 -17.1 -23.5 -10.7 -23.2 -3.1 -13.1 -15.2 -10.1 -21.4 -21.4
Share of improvements (%) 65 60 74 70 65 72 61 67 44 35
Memorandum items: 
Population
t 2 -0.7 2.3 1.8 -4.0 -0.7 -4.5 7.1 -16.8 1.6 4.7 -7.5
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)
u 2 -29.8 -31.4 -33.5 -20.1 -24.7 -15.0 -29.0 -23.6 -18.0 -29.8 -30.4
Sources: Statistical Annex and MONEE project database unless otherwise indicated.
Note: 1. Absolute change. 2. Percent change.
a. As reported by countries, based on registered number of live births and infant deaths. FR Yugoslavia refers to 1989-98; 1998 data for Kosovo: FSOY estimate. Albania refers to 1989-98, B-H to 1990-99. 1999:
data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr; data for Georgia exclude Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
b. FR Yugoslavia refers to 1989-98; 1998 data for Kosovo: FSOY estimate. Tajikistan refers to 1989-95. 1999: data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr; data for Georgia exclude Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
c. Poland, Albania and Turkmenistan refer to 1989-98, FR Yugoslavia to 1989-97, Croatia and Uzbekistan to 1990-99, Latvia and Lithuania to 1991-99. 1999: data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr; data for Georgia
exclude Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
d. Slovenia refers to 1989-98. 1999: data for FR Yugoslavia exclude Kosovo; data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr.
e. Two-year averages as of beginning and end of the period. Poland and Albania refer to 1989-98, Slovenia to 1989-95, FR Yugoslavia to 1989-97, Tajikistan to 1989-95. 1999: data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr;
data for Georgia exclude Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
f. FR Yugoslavia refers to 1989-98; 1998 data for Kosovo: FSOY estimate. Albania refers to 1989-96, Tajikistan to 1989-95. 1999: data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr; deaths for Georgia exclude Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali.
g. Croatia refers to 1989-95, FYR Macedonia and Tajikistan to 1989-97, FR Yugoslavia to 1989-98; 1998 data for Kosovo: FSOY estimate.
h. Tajikistan refers to 1990-99. FR Yugoslavia: 1992-98 excludes Albanian students in Kosovo, 1999 excludes Kosovo. 1999: data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr.
i. Includes syphilis and gonorrhoea; Latvia includes also chlamydial infection, Kyrgyzstan includes also trychomonyasis. Slovenia, FR Yugoslavia and Kazakhstan refer to 1989-98. FR Yugoslavia, 1998 data for Kosovo:
FSOY estimate. Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan refer to 1990-99, Uzbekistan to 1991-99. 1999: population for Moldova excludes Transdniestr; cases for Georgia exclude Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
j. FR Yugoslavia refers to 1989-98; 1998 data for Kosovo: FSOY estimate. Poland refers to 1989-98, FYR Macedonia to 1989-97, Tajikistan to 1989-95, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan to 1990-99. 1999:
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-20.4 7.2 -10.8 0.9 -6.4 -4.1 -6.3 -8.4 25.8 13.8 -1.8
-10.9 -9.7 -5.7 26.4 -25.9 51.4 12.3 -38.9 23.7 -40.5 19.6
1.4 1.0 1.1 -2.5 -0.8 -2.1 -1.3 0.8 0.9 -2.1
-0.4 -0.4 0.1 -4.6 -1.3 -4.3 -3.0 1.7 1.5 -3.6
11.3 8.2 -7.5 0.9 -28.6 -10.3 -18.9 -23.6 -7.7 -16.6 -42.6
3.0 34.5 -2.0 131.5 80.2 163.9 80.9 -5.4 -4.8 5.8 128.7
-5.8 -3.4 10.6 6.3 0.7 9.3 2.0 -1.7 -1.4 -1.0 4.3
18.7 42.0 44.4 23.1 27.2 47.3 20.1 25.1 17.0 58.1 48.7
34.8 18.0 28.2 29.4 6.8 16.4 11.4 -5.1 -2.5 -7.5 2.2
24.2 46.6 107.6 42.1 -11.3 30.2 39.2 142.0 17.9 -17.2 -22.8
14.9 8.0 9.6 -5.5 -28.6 -8.1 -7.7 -23.0 -20.1 -18.4 -18.3
81.8 79.5 16.1 109.6 49.2 85.0 94.0 80.1 -7.5 10.3 150.1
-8.0 -3.1 -9.1 -7.7 -11.7 -4.6 -5.4 -11.7 -12.0 -21.8 -8.3
-16.6 -34.6 -37.9 -18.4 -62.8 -42.4 -62.2 -49.0 -58.5 -65.3 -32.0
-33.8 -35.0 -52.2 -12.6 -64.9 -61.8 -51.6 -49.8 -26.8 -58.5
-18.8 -17.5 -11.5 -12.4 -15.0 -13.1 -10.9 -20.1 -9.1 -17.0 -14.2
45 40 50 25 35 25 25 47 45 44 30
-8.0 -8.9 0.2 -1.5 -16.1 -0.9 -3.6 9.1 12.9 -2.9 -8.1
-43.8 -45.3 -34.9 -38.5 -44.2 -43.2 -41.6 -55.5 -42.7 -53.9 -39.5
Table 1.1
-9.5 -23.8 -29.3 -17.8 25
-5.8 12.6 -1.7 -17.0 24
-41.5 -1.4 -5.3 -15.7 22
16.6 0.0 -6.3 -8.8 22
-14.7 32.3 -31.5 -26.3 18
-7.8 42.8 12.8 3.1 17
-1.3 -0.4 2.0 16
-1.2 -1.2 1.6 13
-23.1 -9.7 -14.8 -20.6 11
109.5 0.4 42.5 49.3 10
0.2 1.1 6.4 1.0 10
82.3 -5.5 25.7 18.5 9
4.5 -5.6 6.1 -9.1 8
14.6 -60.7 -62.2 -32.9 8
-15.9 -34.6 -37.3 -14.9 8
15.7 -2.2 -6.8 -11.5 6
-13.7 -26.1 -15.0 -9.2 4
-44.2 -63.5 -51.7 -22.2 3
-50.6 -87.4 -65.3 2
-9.6 -19.4 -6.0 -5.5 0
30 30 40 41
12.3 19.3 32.6 21.2
-29.6 -52.5 -46.9 -32.8
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k. Slovenia refers to 1991-98, Kazakhstan to 1989-98, Albania to 1989-97, Uzbekistan to 1990-99, FR Yugoslavia to 1989-98; 1998 data for Kosovo: FSOY estimate. 1999: population for Moldova excludes Transdniestr; cases
for Georgia exclude Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
l. FR Yugoslavia refers to 1989-98; 1998 data for Kosovo: FSOY estimate. 1999: data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr; data for Georgia exclude Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
m. Czech Republic refers to 1991-99, Slovenia and FYR Macedonia to 1989-98, Romania to 1990-98, Estonia to 1994-99, Georgia and Tajikistan to 1990-99. 1999: data for FR Yugoslavia exclude Kosovo; data for Moldova
exclude Transdniestr.
n. Slovenia refers to 1993-98, Croatia to 1991-99, Romania and Estonia to 1990-99, Lithuania to 1992-99, Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to 1989-98, Kazakhstan to 1989-97. 1999: data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr;
enrolments for Georgia exclude Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
o. Slovakia refers to 1989-96, Poland to 1989-93, Slovenia to 1989-95, Croatia to 1990-98, Albania to 1994-98, Romania to 1990-97, Estonia to 1989-97 (0-7 year-olds), Ukraine to 1991-99, Kyrgyzstan to 1990-99, Uzbekistan
to 1989-98. Armenia: 0-5 year-olds. FR Yugoslavia refers to 1990-98; 1998 excludes Kosovo. 1999: data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr.
p. IRC estimates based on the number of graduates and population aged 15. Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania refer to 1990-98, Croat ia and Bulgaria to 1993-97, FR Yugoslavia to 1989-94, Estonia to 1990-99, Armenia and
Tajikistan to 1989-97, Turkmenistan to 1989-96.
q. FR Yugoslavia: GDP from UNECE (2000), Economic Survey of Europe, No. 1, Geneva: UN Economic Commission for Europe.
r. Albania refers to 1996-99, Belarus, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to 1993-99, Kazakhstan to 1991-99, Kyrgyzstan to 1990-99.
s. Azerbaijan refers to 1990-99. 1999: data for Moldova exclude Transdniestr.
t. B-H: US Census Bureau (2000), International Data Base (IDB), <www.census.gov/ipc/idbnew.htm>: International Programs Center, US Bureau of the Census. Moldova: 1999 excludes Transdniestr.


















Baltic States Western CIS Caucasus Central Asiaby civil unrest in 1997 following the collapse of pyramid
savings schemes that impoverished many households.
The worst outcomes occurred in the western CIS coun-
tries of Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, where fewer
than a third of the indicators show improvements. It is tempt-
ing to link this to inconsistent economic reforms, although it
is clear that the collapse of the industrial state built in Soviet
times has affected urbanized society in these countries partic-
ularly badly. Moldova shows a big drop in the memorandum
item on population change because of a loss in administrative
control over the Transdniestr area. The other three countries
also post a negative population change, despite the Slavic
homecoming from other parts of the former Soviet Union.
Interestingly, despite war and hostilities and some
major economic setbacks, the countries of the Caucasus
have tended to register more improvements in welfare than
have other CIS countries. In the southern parts of the for-
mer Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
show slightly worse welfare outcomes than do the other two
countries of Central Asia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
The often surprisingly good performance of several
countries in the southern belt of the region may reflect
their comparative advantage in life styles, including
stronger traditional social institutions, particularly the
extended family. Cohesive communities offer effective
material help, as well as moral support to protect the indi-
vidual during times of hardship. In this light, the countries
which display worse social records may be caught between
weak traditional structures and slow progress in social sec-
tor reforms, including the strengthening and revival of
community and civic networks.
Performance according to social 
and economic indicators
Since the indicators in Table 1.1 are listed in order accord-
ing to the performance across the region, it is easy to see
which indicators show good news the most often and which
indicators tend to transmit bad news.
The indicator that heads the table is the infant mor-
tality rate. This key indicator of child (and maternal) wel-
fare shows progress in almost every country; only Bulgaria
and Latvia register some small deterioration. Three of the
four indicators next in the ranking – the teenage birth rate,
the abortion rate and maternal mortality – also reflect
aspects of maternal health or child health, making a con-
sistent story with the infant mortality rate.
What factors are behind this striking outcome? To aid
the discussion, Figure 1.6 shows the evolution of the infant
mortality rate by main sub-regions for the full period
between 1989 and 1999. (The diagram also includes the
EU average rate.) It is clear that the survival chances of
infants mostly deteriorated or stagnated in the first part of
the 1990s. Improvements dominated the picture only in
the second part of the decade.
In some countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus
the reductions in infant mortality may be partly due to
under-recording in the administrative figures (see Chapter
3). More home births and fees for birth registration are
thought to affect the reporting of infant births and deaths
(see Box 1.4 later in the chapter).
However, one driving force behind the lower rates of
infant death across the region is likely to be the huge drop
in the birth rate – see the memorandum items at the bot-
tom of Table 1.1. Among other things, fewer births mean
the existing resources in the health sector for maternity
care go further. Past investments in education may also take
some of the credit, resulting, for example, in a continued
take-up of health services.
By 1999, youth mortality and female life expectancy
had improved in more than half of the countries, and male
life expectancy in about half. These indicators are markedly
different in Central
Europe relative to the
western CIS. The falls in
male life expectancy of
over four years in Belarus
and Russia are striking
and in large measure are
due to a rise in adult mor-
tality. Chapter 3 shows
that adult mortality has
also risen in the Baltic
states and in some south-
ern countries, for example
Kazakhstan. The MONEE
project estimates that
higher mortality led to
about 3.2 million “excess”
deaths over 1990-99 in
the region as a whole,































cit.: see Figure 1.5.
Note: Unweighted averages. 1992-97: data for Bosnia-Herzegovina refer to Federation of B-H. Several countries maintain the “Soviet” concept of live birth, while oth-
ers shifted to the WHO concept in the 1990s. (See the notes to Statistical Annex, Table 3.1 and the Glossary for details).The good news of a general picture of economic recovery
in the second half of the 1990s is tempered by the uncer-
tain progress in various countries. This shows up in changes
in output per head for South-Eastern Europe, for example,
and in the western CIS, where recovery is very weak.
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Two aspects of the calculations in Figure 1.7 are impor-
tant to note. First, the per capita adjustment makes a big dif-
ference in few countries where there have been large changes
in total population. This affects the figures for Central Asia
in particular, where population grew by a fifth in Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan over 1989-99 and by a third in Turkmenistan
(see the memorandum items at the bottom of Table 1.1). On
More family breakdowns, more juvenile crime, fewer upper
secondary education enrolments, higher rates of infants left
to public care and fewer graduations from basic schools
were all frequent in the region over the 1990s. There is
often an interplay in these trends, which in part have com-
mon roots in fewer social controls and the emergence of
unemployment and greater poverty that hinder people from
seizing the new opportunities.
The three economic indicators occupy the last three
positions in the table. In Poland, Hungary and Slovenia
measured national income per head (GDP per capita) was
greater in 1999 than it had been 10 years earlier, with the
Czech Republic and Slovakia nearly making it there.
Only Poland managed to match full recovery in per capita
GDP with a significant rise in real wages. But even there
employment fell. The employment rate (measured as total
employment divided by the number of persons aged 15-
59) fell in every country over 1989-99, on average by 14
percent.
 
What signs are there now of steady eco-
nomic growth in the region? And are the
institutional conditions for promoting
growth now in place? This section first
addresses these two questions. Levels of
public expenditure are then considered,
together with the quality of public sector
institutions, including the issue of corrup-
tion. The section concludes by looking at
evidence on people’s perceptions both of
inequalities in their country and of what
determines individual success.
Economic contraction and rebound
Figure 1.7 shows the degree of contraction
of GDP per capita and the pattern of recov-
ery by sub-region for the full period 1989-
99 and, using preliminary estimates of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), extends the investigation up to 2000.
All parts of the region underwent a considerable
regression in measured output per head during the 1990s,
but the extent of this varied enormously. The decline in
Central Europe was by less than a fifth, with growth already
setting in during the first half of the decade. At the other
extreme, the fall in the Caucasus was as much as two-thirds,
with recovery not starting until later in the decade. By
2000, only Central Europe was clearly ahead of the 1989
starting line, while the western CIS, the Caucasus and
Central Asia were still back – by 40-55 percent on average.
have occurred if mortality rates had stayed at their 1989
levels (see Chapter 3).
The news from the remaining 12 indicators is more
bad than good. Despite the big falls in births noted above,
pre-school enrolment rates are down in 15 of the 26 coun-
tries for which data are available. Suicide among teenagers,
sexually transmitted diseases and tuberculosis hit hard in
the western CIS, as well as Central Asia, and none of the
other sub-regions are free of these problems. The rise in the
incidence of tuberculosis in the Baltic states, for example,
is quite striking. Adolescent suicide is up in 14 countries,
including the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. The
figures for sexually transmitted diseases do not take into
account the dramatic rise in HIV infection. Estimates by
UNAIDS put the number of infections at the end of 2000
at over 700,000 cases, the great majority of which have
occurred in the last few years in Ukraine and Russia (see
Chapter 3).
Further down the list, various indicators on family
cohesion and child education tell a disheartening story.
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1.3 Economic Reforms and Individual Well-Being


























for Europe. Note: Unweighted averages. Former Yugoslavia excludes Bosnia-Herzegovina.average, by 2000 total output had recovered in Central Asia
to 70 percent of that in 1989, but total output per head was
only 60 percent of the original level. Countries with rapidly
rising populations need significant economic growth even
for average income per head to stay still.
Second, the diagram refers to measured output.
Although estimates for informal activity may be included
in the data for some countries, these estimates are unlikely
to be adequate. The graph may therefore overestimate the
extent of the contraction in total GDP and underestimate
subsequent growth. One attempt to estimate the output of
the informal economy in transition countries in the mid-
1990s put its size at less than 10 percent of GDP in
Uzbekistan, at one extreme, to over 60 percent in Georgia,
at the other, with Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Russia and
several other countries at around 30-40 percent.
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What have lower levels of national income meant for
peoples’ lives? The answer is less money for households to
buy food, clothing and other goods and services. It also
means, for example, fewer resources in the health and edu-
cation sectors to pay the wages of doctors, nurses and teach-
ers and to buy medicines, equipment, heating and so on.
Figure 1.8 illustrates the impact on households’ ability to
consume food, showing changes over 1989-99 in daily per
capita calorie intake among two-child families in Bulgaria,
alongside the changes in GDP. The two series track each
other quite closely.
A recovery in GDP should mean both more resources
for households to spend and more revenue for governments
to devote to basic social services. However, the experience
of the transition countries shows that there may not be
quick recovery in employment. Work is important as a
source of income, but also because it helps self-esteem and
personal development. As Table 1.1 shows, the employ-
ment rate among people of active working age was lower in
all countries in 1999 than in 1989, including those coun-
tries where GDP had recovered to its starting level. The
1999 Regional Monitoring Report found that more jobs dis-
appeared in the 1990s among women than among men.
The relatively favourable position of women in the labour
market, which had made the region comparable to Sweden,
the leader in the West in this regard, is now a phenomenon
of the past in most transition countries.
Not all job losses translate into unemployment, since
some people do not seek further work (the rise in tertiary
education shown in Table 1.1 means that in some cases cur-
rent labour market inactivity may mean higher future
wages). However, unemployment has been a notable fea-
ture of the transition in many countries. Figure 1.9 shows
that unemployment hits young people in the region harder
than it does adults: the average rate for 15-24 year-olds is
twice that for all people of working age. (The diagram uses
measures of unemployment based on surveys rather than
administrative registers – the latter severely understate the
problem in countries where there is little incentive to reg-
ister.) The same pattern is typically found in other indus-
trialized countries, but it is notable that in 12 of the 18
countries in the diagram the youth unemployment rate is
higher than the EU average of 21 percent. In several coun-
tries in the southern belt of the region, young people face





in the transition con-
text is commonly asso-
ciated in people’s
minds with the devel-
opment of a market
economy. The vertical
axis of Figure 1.10
shows an index of
progress in the cre-
















































































No. 7, Table 4.2. Note: The definition of employment is that of ILO/OECD which is based on job search status (or self-classification).Table 1.2 summarizes their rankings. (The top places in tables
based on both criteria are occupied by a predictable selection
of North American, European and Asian economies.)
The four Central European economies are relatively
well placed on the criterion of current competitiveness.
Hungary, for instance, is ranked higher than Greece; all four
are higher than Mexico. The other three countries are towards
the bottom of the table. In the ranking by growth competi-
tiveness, three of the Central European economies do even
better, with Hungary outstripping Spain, Korea and Italy.
These comparisons show that some advanced transi-
tion countries have been able to capitalize on their past
achievements, in particular their strong education systems.
The potential for skill-based, technology-driven economic
growth – rather than one based on cheap, unskilled labour
or relatively unprocessed raw materials – should be present
for other countries as well.
14
Public expenditures, governance and corruption
While private sector development is clearly essential,
retaining a strong public sector is important. Figure 1.11
institutions. This index is the
average values in 2000 of a
range of indicators developed
by the EBRD. (A value of over
“4” for any of these indicators
is considered a reasonable one
for an established industrial-
ized market economy.)
Central European and
Baltic states score the highest
on the institutional reform of
the economy. The values of
this index correlate well with
private sector development.
For example, the EBRD’s
estimates of the private sec-
tor share of GDP averages
about 75 percent in Central
Europe and less than 50 per-
cent in Central Asia (with an average for all countries of
58 percent).
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But Figure 1.10 illustrates the correlation of eco-
nomic reform with something else: democratic reform. The
horizontal axis shows the values in 1999 of an index
intended to measure the extent of reform in the political
process, the development of civil society and of an inde-
pendent media, and the quality of public administration.
The message seems clear: the development of democratic
institutions and civil liberties go hand in hand with the cre-
ation of a market economy. The graph updates an analysis
in the 1999 EBRD Transition Report which concluded that
economic and democratic reform are mutually reinforcing:
each one helps the other.
Progress in the development of markets has implica-
tions for the expectation of future economic growth that
attracts capital investment, including foreign direct invest-
ment – which in turn should improve growth. In the knowl-
edge-based global economy, capacity to absorb effective
innovation and transfers of technology is important for
growth potential. In 1998-99 foreign direct investment
reached 4-5 percent of GDP, on average, in the 26 transi-
tion countries monitored by the EBRD. Between 1989 and
1999 the region received $102 billion in net foreign direct
investments, 52 percent of which went to three countries:
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
12 The same coun-
tries featured strongly in an international assessment of
“economic creativity”: of 59 countries, Hungary was ranked
21st – above France and New Zealand; Poland was ranked
25th – above Korea and Austria; the Czech Republic was
ranked 41st – close to Italy and above Argentina.
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The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness
Report ranks countries according to the Forum’s assessment of
their “current competitiveness” and their “growth competi-
tiveness” (potential for fast growth), with the latter in part a
function of the index of economic creativity referred to above.
The 2000 report included seven transition countries, and






























































Note: The index of economic reform is the unweighted average of the EBRD’s scores for eight dimensions of the transition, including privatization, enterprise
restructuring, price liberalization and banking reform. The index of democratic reform takes into account the political process, civil society, the independence
of the media, and governance and public administration. Ratings from “1” (lowest) to “7” (highest) in each of these four areas are averaged by Freedom House
to determine a final “democratization score”, which is used here. The report and data are available at <www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2000/>.
Table 1.2
Rankings by current competitiveness 
and growth competitiveness, 2000
Current competitiveness Growth competitiveness
(out of 58 countries) (out of 59 countries)
Hungary32 26






Source: World  Economic  Forum  (2000),  The  Global  Competitiveness  Report  2000, 
New York: Oxford University Press.shows the change in the share of GDP spent by govern-
ments (combining figures for central and local govern-
ment), one measure of the size of the public sector
(although not necessarily of its strength). Since one of the
purposes of the transition is to reduce the once pervasive
role of the state, a decrease over the 1990s in government
revenues and spending as a percentage of GDP is not sur-
prising. However, in a number of countries, typically in the
southern parts of the region, government spending shares
are now at levels which impair the functioning of vital state
institutions, especially if the big falls in GDP are also taken
into account. For example, public expenditure on health
and education in 1998 totalled less than 4 percent of GDP
in both Armenia and Georgia.
Although there have been rises in the size of the gov-
ernment sector in recent years in the Caucasus and Central
Asia, basic social services have not necessarily benefited.
Public sector expenditure on health in Kazakhstan, for
example, fell from 4.2 percent of GDP in 1995 to 2.2 per-
cent in 1999 despite a significant rise in the share of total
government expenditure in GDP (from 20.8 to 24.4 per-
cent). As later chapters make clear, improving the capabil-
ity of the state to carry out its responsibilities in new ways
in the new circumstances takes time, and reforms that
promise long-term gains require sound financing.
In most countries, total public expenditures in fact
fell less sharply in the 1990s than did tax revenues, high-
lighting a situation in which the state tries to carry out its
functions with too few resources. In some cases a deter-
mined effort to raise more revenue is the appropriate
response. In others, the solution is, firstly, to limit activity
to tasks that the state can carry out more effectively than
the private sector and, secondly, to increase efficiency – to
do a better job with the available resources.
One aspect of greater efficiency in the state sector is
better public “governance”: the way the state exercises its
authority. This aspect of public sector performance is
receiving growing attention in discussions of economic
reform. The 1999 EBRD Transition Report devoted a chap-
ter to the topic. The quality of governance is important for
both the equity and the efficiency with which the public
sector supplies basic social services such as health and edu-
cation, as well as for the development of the private sec-
tor. Measures of good governance appear to correlate well
both with foreign direct investment and economic growth
in the transition countries and, worldwide, with social
progress.
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Corruption is one aspect of bad governance. The
reduction in the size of the public sector has created many
opportunities for corruption to flourish. The scale of trans-
fers of public assets to private persons has been unprece-
dented, a process that has been under the control of offi-
cials who on occasion have abused their powers to make use
of the opportunities presented. Other aspects of the devel-
opment of the private sector have also been subject to reg-
ulation by public officials, again providing a potential
source for corrupt earnings (for example, in return for
granting export rights). Corruption can also extend to pub-
lic education through the “sale” of exam marks or of places
in desirable schools and universities. Informal payments for
notionally free medical treatment is a corrupt practice in
state health systems – Chapter 3 shows this to be a com-
mon problem in transition countries, and it is a burden
borne with most difficulty by the poor. Educational and
health outcomes may suffer as a result.
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The measurement of good governance, including the
lack of corruption, is not straightforward. Assessments rely
in part on questionnaires to entrepreneurs and businessmen
that cover subjects such as political stability, property
rights, the predictability of rules, judiciary reliability and
more direct questions on corruption in government.
17
These surveys tend to show the transition countries
performing worse than the international average. For
example, this is the case with Transparency International’s
2001 Corruption Perceptions Index, which covers 91 coun-
tries, including 17 in Central and Eastern Europe and the
CIS. Higher values of the index denote less corruption,
with 10 the maximum score possible. The 17 transition
countries averaged a score of 3.6, compared to the average
for all countries of 4.8. Only three – Estonia, Hungary and
Slovenia – scored between 5 and 6, still well below the EU
average of 8.
Both an absence of corruption and good governance
in broader terms can be expected to correlate positively
with the level of economic development. Some studies find
that the difference in corruption and governance between
the transition countries and richer countries tends to dis-
appear once GDP is held constant, implying that the tran-
sition countries are no worse than countries at the same
level of national income. However, this is only the case for
the more economically advanced countries; CIS countries
appear still to perform somewhat worse than countries at
the same income level.
18
How is corruption linked to overall human develop-


























Annex, Table 10.4. Note: Former Yugoslavia excludes FR Yugoslavia. 1999: estimate.the western CIS. Results are given in the form of the aver-
ages for these seven countries and are compared with the
averages for 12 advanced OECD countries.
There are striking disparities in the answers given to
two questions on income differences. On average, almost
two-thirds of the people from Central and Eastern Europe
considered the differences between people in income to be
too large in their countries, almost double the figure for the
Western countries. Likewise, almost twice as many people
in the transition countries strongly agreed with the state-
ment that the government should reduce income inequal-
ity. The actual levels of income inequality and the
values of the 2001
Corruption Perceptions
Index against the 1999
UNDP Human Devel-
opment Index scores
(higher values on the
former indicate less cor-
ruption). In the main,
the transition countries
do somewhat more
poorly than other coun-




one would expect cor-
ruption to be lower than
it is in these countries.
Perceptions of inequality and of reward
The transition has opened the way for people to contribute
to a society of their own making. How do people view the
impact of the transition on their lives, and what sort of
society do they want the transition to lead to?
Table 1.3 presents evidence on one aspect, people’s
attitudes to inequality and social justice. It draws on the
1999 round of the International Social Survey Programme,
which included seven Central and Eastern European coun-
tries: three from Central Europe and one each from South-
Eastern Europe, former Yugoslavia, the Baltic states, and
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Note: Higher values of the corruption perceptions index imply lower levels of corruption. The line on the diagram represents the regression of the corruption perceptions
index on the HDI and its square.
Table 1.3
Attitudes to inequality and justice in transition and market economies
CEE (%) OECD (%) Difference
I In nc co om me e   d di if ff fe er re en nc ce es s
1. Differences in income are too large in your country? (“strongly agree”) 64 35 +29
2. It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes between people with high and low 
incomes (“strongly agree”) 47 26 +21
W Wh ha at t   d do oe es s   d de et te er rm mi in ne e   a ad dv va an nt ta ag ge e? ?
3. In your country people get rewarded for their effort? (“disagree” or “strongly disagree”) 69 32 +37
4. In your country people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills? (“disagree” or “strongly disagree”) 58 24 +34
5. To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt? (“agree” or “strongly agree”) 51 29 +22
6. How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family? (“essential” or “very important”) 40 23 +17
7. How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people? (“essential” or “very important”) 59 49 +10
W Wh ha at t   s sh ho ou ul ld d   d de et te er rm mi in ne e   a ad dv va an nt ta ag ge e? ?
8. It’s just to be able to buy better education for children if you have higher income? (“very unjust”) 44 40 +4
9. It’s just to be able to buy better health care if you have higher income? (“very unjust”) 40 42 -2
10. How well the job is done is important for determining pay? (“essential” or “very important”) 80 83 -3
11. Responsibility with the job is important for determining pay? (“essential” or “very important”) 75 78 -3
12. Whether job requires supervising others is important for determining pay? (“essential” or “very important”) 51 49 +2
13. Whether the person has children to support is important for determining pay? (“essential” or “very important”) 46 42 +4
14. Number of years spent in education is important for determining pay? (“essential” or “very important”) 56 50 +6
Source: Redmond, G., S. V. Schnepf and M. Suhrcke (2001), “Attitudes to Inequality after Ten Years of Transition”, Innocenti Working Papers, No. 88.
Note: Central and Eastern European countries (CEE): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia and Slovenia. OECD coun tries: Austria, Canada, France, Germany, UK, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. Samples included about 1,000 adults in each country. Figures refer to unweighted mean  values.In early 2000, there were 410 million people living in the
27 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS –
see Table 1.4. This was the same number as at the begin-
ning of the decade, which might seem to imply that little
alteration had occurred in the 1990s in the region’s demo-
graphic make-up. But nothing could be further from the
truth: the decade saw huge changes in various aspects of the
transition countries’ populations. The discussion of Table
1.1 has already mentioned the large fall in births, for exam-
ple, and the table also shows the large changes in popula-
tion in some countries. This section describes in more
detail some of the changes that have taken place, focusing
on fertility and marriage.
The shifts in demographic behaviour reflect a range
of different factors – lower incomes, uncertainty about the
future, a more open and permissive society and so on.
Several are directly relevant for the discussion of topics in
later chapters. Many reflect the changing nature of the fam-
increases that occurred during the 1990s are discussed in
Chapter 2.
These large differences typically continue in the
answers to the questions on what people believe actually
does determine income and other aspects of advantage in
their country. People in the transition countries regard
their societies as much less meritocratic than do citizens of
Western countries: the majority believe that individuals are
rewarded not for their efforts or their intelligence and skills,
but for other attributes, including being corrupt and know-
ing the right people.
However, the responses to the questions on what peo-
ple think should determine pay and access to education and
health services suggest that, on average, people in the tran-
sition countries and in the established market economies
share the same values. For example, there are only small
differences in opinion on whether people with higher
income should be able to buy better education for their
ily – the institution with the greatest and most immediate
impact on child development.
Plunging numbers of births
The total number of children at the start of 2000, nearly
108 million, is about 14 million fewer than the number in
1989. The share of children in the region’s population has
fallen from about 30 percent to 26 percent. The figure is,
however, much higher in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.
Central Asia continues to be rich in children: over 40 per-
cent of the population there is aged under 18.
The 14 million fewer children represent an average fall
of 13 percent, but the picture varies greatly across the region:
18 percent fewer children in Central Europe, but 8 percent
more in Central Asia, where, except in Kazakhstan, popula-
tion numbers have continued to grow. These figures mask far
bigger changes in the numbers of children born since 1989.
This is brought out by Figure 1.13, which shows the change
in each country between 1989 and 2000 in the total child
population and in the numbers of young children, defined
here as those children below age 5.
The total child population has dropped in all but six
countries: Albania, Azerbaijan and four of the Central
Asian countries. The young child population, however, has
fallen in every country. The average fall is 31 percent –
nearly a third. In 10 countries, seven of them in the CIS,
the reduction exceeds 40 percent.
Figure 1.14 sheds further light on the issue by show-
ing changes in the total fertility rate: the expected number
of births a woman will have in her lifetime given prevail-
ing age-specific birth rates. In the main, fertility was still
falling at the end of the decade: only Bulgaria, Estonia,
children and better health care. In both sets of countries,
around half of the people interviewed thought that years
spent in education should be important in determining pay,
and about three-quarters thought degree of responsibility a
very relevant factor. Around 40-45 percent agree that fam-
ily responsibilities should be an important factor.
The evidence in the table presents policy-makers in
these transition countries with a challenge. Broadly speak-
ing, people support the notion that incomes should be
determined by factors relevant to the working of market
forces – ability to perform on the job, responsibility and
education, although the evidence also shows that many
people see a person’s family needs as important, too, as in
Western countries. However, a lot of people in Central and
Eastern Europe believe that, in reality, many differences in
income do not reflect merit, and they are very concerned




1.4 Demographic Change and Family Formation
Table 1.4
Total and child populations, January 2000
Total population Child population, aged 0-17 Children in total population
(1,000s) (1,000s) (%)
Central Europe 64,370 15,160 24
Former Yugoslavia 22,960 5,600 24
South-Eastern Europe 34,040 8,020 24
Baltic states 7,560 1,770 23
Western CIS 208,680 48,520 23
Caucasus 16,920 5,460 32
Central Asia 55,260 23,190 42
Total 409,790 107,720 26
Source: Statistical Annex, Tables 1.1 and 1.2.Latvia and Belarus experienced a rise
between 1998 and 1999. With the excep-
tion of Central Asia, by the end of the 1990s
all sub-regions had fertility levels below the
value needed to keep the population con-
stant over the long term. (There is no series
included for former Yugoslavia.) At the start
of the decade, only Central Europe had
been clearly in this position.
The decline in fertility in Central
Asia is much bigger than is suggested by
Figure 1.13. The number of births in the
1990s that lies behind the earlier graph is
swollen by the significant increase in the
number of young women in Central Asia
during the decade. It may also be the case





































































































op. cit.: see Figure 1.5.
Note: Unweighted averages (weighted in the case of the EU). 1989 value set to that in 1990 for Uzbekistan. 1999 value set to that in
1998 for Russia. 1993 value for Georgia set to the average of 1992 and 1994 values.
Registration at birth is confirmed as a human right by
Article 7 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Among other things, birth registration increases
the probability that a child will benefit from a range of
basic social services that further child development.
Registration systems in the transition countries
are considered quite thorough. However, recent surveys
have highlighted possible gaps in birth registration in
several countries in the southern belt of the region. The
problem is linked to poverty, shrinking state revenues
and the fact that more births are taking place at home.
Fees charged for birth registration may discourage poor
families from registering their new children.
Table 1.5 shows the fees parents must pay in some
countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a percent
of the monthly wage. Fees are strikingly high in Tajikistan
and significant in Georgia. Costs of registering a birth
appear negligible in Kazakhstan, but anecdotal evidence
indicates substantial regional variation (from 200 to 500
tenges, compared to the official fee of 98 tenges).
The results of the high fees
relative to wages show up in the
available  data.  In  Tajikistan,  a
UNICEF survey conducted in 2000
found that the births of only 75
percent of children under age 5
had been included in the civil reg-
isters. This would imply that about
190,000 children are missing. In
Georgia in 2000, the number of
births recorded at civil registration
offices was only 87 percent of the
births in Ministry of Health records,
although,  as  in  other  countries




Birth registration: are all children included on the nation’s books?
Table 1.5
Birth registration fees as a percent






Sources:  CIS  Stat  (2000),  Official  Statistics  of  the
Commonwealth of Independent States, Moscow: Interstate
Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, -CD Rom-; UNICEF field offices.
Note: Figures calculated from information on birth registration
fees and monthly wages.that recording problems contribute to the falling measured
fertility rate in this part of the region, although this can
only be a very small part of the explanation for the five
Central Asian countries as a whole: as Box 1.4 describes,
the births of some children may not be registered.
The low levels of fertility in many countries have
gained considerable attention in the press and other mass
media. This is true in Russia, for example, where, alongside
the decline in fertility, there has been a striking fall in life
expectancy as well, as noted earlier. The combination has
prompted speculation about the future course of the
Russian population. Despite immigration from other CIS
countries, a continuing fall in total population is antici-
pated. Figure 1.15 shows three population projections for
Russia up to 2015 that have been taken from different
sources; the national estimate puts forward the most dra-
matic scenario, a decline of over 7 percent.
Do the falls in fertility represent a demographic “cri-
sis”, a crisis brought on by the economic and social transi-
tion in the 1990s? The falls, after all, are far bigger than
those in the EU over the 1990s, as Figure 1.14 also shows.
Several points can be made.
First, falling fertility in the region in part merely rep-
resents a continuation of earlier trends in fertility rates
being experienced by many industrialized countries
(notwithstanding the comment above about the EU’s expe-
rience in the 1990s). Figure 1.16 shows trends over the last
three decades of the 20th century for the Czech Republic
and Uzbekistan. The former currently has the lowest fertil-
ity rate in the region, together with Georgia, Latvia and
Armenia, while the latter has the highest rate. For com-
parison, data are included for the two countries that repre-
sent the extremes of the current range in fertility rates in
the OECD: Spain and Turkey.
20
The 1990s do appear to have been a departure from
the trend for the two transition countries. Had the average
decline over 1970-89 continued into the 1990s, the total
fertility rate in Uzbekistan in 1999 would have been about
3.5 rather than 2.7. The Czech Republic had a sharp down-
wards shift in the first half of the decade at the time the
country’s economy was going through its worst period since
the end of central planning.
On the other hand, the changes over the last quarter-
century in the two countries are not that dissimilar to those
in Spain and Turkey. This might suggest that the 1990s
have merely speeded the long-term reduction to the level
of other industrialized countries. However, it is the case
that fertility in many transition countries is now quite low
compared to a broader international yardstick. The average
fertility rate in the 10 EU-applicant countries, for example,
was 1.26 in 1999, compared to the figure in 1998 for the EU
of 1.45 shown in Figure 1.14.
Second, some researchers have maintained that the
changes in the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe and
the CIS in part reflect a decision by many young women to
postpone having children, especially a second child, rather
than a permanent reduction in fertility level.
21 On this
argument, fertility will recover to some extent, as steady
economic growth continues, when those female cohorts
who were in their early 20s at the start of the transition
approach the end of their childbearing age.
Third, a fall in fertil-
ity is not necessarily a bad
thing, calling into question
the use of the word “crisis”
to describe what has taken
place. There are arguments
both ways, and more
research is needed to inves-
tigate the implications for
the transition countries.
On the one hand, it is
true that a lower birth rate
will in time lead to an age-
ing population and that the
proportion of people of
working age will decline.
This has various implica-
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2000, Geneva: WHO.Figure 1.17 shows the massive decline in marriage rates
over the 1990s – by 34 percent, on average, and by over 50
percent in the Baltic states and the Caucasus. There is lit-
tle sign of any recovery at the end of the decade, although
all four western CIS countries registered rises in 1999.
These changes were mostly driven by the decisions of
young people. Figure 1.18 shows marriage rates among
women aged 16-24 in 20 countries in 1989 and 1999,
together with the EU average in the mid-1990s of 30 per
1,000. The countries are ranked on the 1999 rate. Despite
the sharp fall in marriage among young women during the
1990s, the rates in most countries at the end of the decade
were still substantially above the EU average: 14 out of 20
had rates of over 40.
Interestingly, in many countries the sharp fall in mar-
riage has not been accompanied by a significant rise in the
average age of marriage among those who do marry. Of the
24 countries for which information on average age at first
marriage is available for women for 1999 (or in one case
1998), 14 countries registered a rise after 1989 of less than
one year (see Statistical Annex, Table 5.2). No CIS coun-
harder the financing of pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tems in which today’s pensions are paid for by
today’s contributions, as is the case with many social
insurance systems. And private savings may fall, to
the extent that the elderly save less. The OECD
countries have long faced these challenges which
the transition countries will have to confront.
22
On the other hand, a fall in fertility is typi-
cally seen in a positive light in the discussion of liv-
ing standards in countries at lower levels of devel-
opment than most of the transition countries, with
theories predicting an increase in economic growth
as a result.
23 In all but three of the transition coun-
tries, there has been a fall in the teenage birth rate,
and it is hard to label this as anything other than a
good thing (see the second row in Table 1.1). And
if families are smaller, children may benefit more
from existing state services, and each child may
receive more attention from his or her parents.
The changing notion of the family
In Western industrialized countries, growing rates of female
education and labour force participation have been accom-
panied in recent decades by changing patterns of family for-
mation and reproductive behaviour. Known as the “second
demographic transition”, the new patterns are character-
ized by later age at first marriage and childbirth and a diver-
sification in family forms, including more single parents
and cohabiting couples.
24
As noted earlier, women in the transition countries had
good access to education and employment, and, up to 1990,
their labour force participation was comparable to or even
higher than that of women in most Western economies. But
they were entering marriage at a relatively young age. In
1989, the region-wide average age of first marriage, 22.5 years,
was closer to that in Greece or Turkey, which exhibited much
lower female labour force participation rates, rather than to
that in France or Sweden, which showed comparable levels of
female education and employment. However, unlike the sit-
uation in more tradi-
tional societies, not
only marriage rates,
but also divorce rates
were relatively high.
The region-wide rate
of divorce was 2 per
1,000 persons of all
ages in 1989, close to
that in France and
Sweden and four





























Note: 1999 value for FR Yugoslavia set to that in 1998. 1992-95 values for Bosnia-Herzegovina set to the average of
















































project database. Note: First year is 1990 for Poland. 1999 values for all countries are IRC estimates based on 1998 data.try saw an increase over the decade; Uzbekistan even
recorded a fall, as did all members of the CIS over 1989-95.
This combination of much lower marriage rates and little
change in average age of marriage suggests either that post-
ponement of marriage is continuing, or that many people
are renouncing marriage altogether.
25
What are the implications of these changes? For some
young people, especially women, postponement of marriage
means more opportunities to study and to establish a career.
For others, it may merely reflect a desire for a different life
in line with a greater feeling of freedom in the new societies
since transition. Less marriage means more people choosing
to remain single or to form partnerships outside of marriage.
However, lower marriage rates may also be due to less pos-
itive factors: unemployment and a concern about future
prospects. The result may be more years spent living in the
parental home.
A fall in marriage has contributed to the changes in
birth rates described earlier, but also to a rise in the share
of births that take place outside marriage. Figure 1.19 shows
the latter. On average, 11 percent of children were born out
of marriage in 1989, while by 1999 this had doubled to 22
percent. The graph shows that there has been a region-wide
change, with no indication that a peak has been reached.
The largest rise has come in the Baltic states. A third or
more of children are now born out of wedlock in Slovenia,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Georgia. The list of countries
in which a quarter of children are born to unmarried moth-
ers includes another four nations: Hungary, Russia,
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
These are huge changes, but the EU trend, also given
in the graph, suggests that Central and Eastern Europe and
the CIS are, to some extent, simply moving with the times.
The rise has been much sharper in most of the transition
countries, but much of the region, including
Central Europe, is still below the EU level. Even the
two highest shares of births out of marriage at the
end of the decade, 54 percent in Estonia and 39 per-
cent in Latvia, can be found mirrored around the
Baltic Sea: 55 percent in Sweden and 37 percent in
Finland. However, the EU does not represent an
appropriate demographic benchmark for all of the
transition region, and the shares of births out of
wedlock in several of the countries in the Caucasus
and Central Asia do seem striking.
Many parents of these children born out of
wedlock will later marry or will cohabit indefinitely.
It would therefore be quite wrong to label the rise
in the share of births that are to unmarried mothers
as a necessarily negative aspect of the transition.
Nevertheless, it is likely that lone parenthood is
now more common than before, and in a small
minority of cases children born to unmarried moth-
ers will end up in public care (see Chapter 5). This
may be more likely when the mother is a teenager.
Statistical Annex, Table 2.7 shows that the share of
births outside marriage that are to teenagers has
climbed to nearly 50 percent, on average, over the
region, notwithstanding the fall in overall teen
birth rates referred to earlier. (This may be com-
pared to a figure of a third in the EU.) The number
of births to unmarried teenage mothers was in fact
higher in 1999 than in 1989 in 18 of the 23 coun-
tries for which information is available.
At the very least the rise in the share of
births outside marriage reflects a loosening of the
formal structure of societies in the region. This
needs to be reflected in legislation on custody,
maintenance, inheritance and family benefits to
ensure that children born out of wedlock are
ensured equal treatment.
Obviously, people who do not marry do not

































Note: 1999 value set to that in 1998 for FR Yugoslavia. 1992-95 values in Bosnia-Herzegovina set to the average of 1991
and 1996 values. 1993 value in Georgia set to the average of 1992 and 1994 values. The series for South-Eastern Europe




























Note: The series for western CIS excludes Ukraine, and that for Central Asia excludes Tajikistan. Number of children
involved in divorce: 1999 value set to that in 1998 for Russia; 1993 value in Georgia set equal to the average of 1992
and 1994 values; 1996-97 values in Moldova are IRC estimates. Weighted averages.the European Union, but, as the rest of the Report shows,
there is also much to do in these countries to make public sec-
tors more efficient and more pro-poor. Promoting good gov-
ernance seems an important issue in most of the region both
for further economic growth and for further social progress.
Third, major shifts in patterns of marriage and fertil-
ity illustrate that the nature of the family is changing. This
partly reflects coping strategies and partly shows the influ-
ence of new opportunities. Public policies need to recognize
the growing incidence of diverse family forms and to adjust
community support and child protection strategies to the
new realities.
Fourth, the large fall in the number of young children
right across the region provides a window of opportunity in
fiscal terms to secure better prospects for teenagers and
young people in the coming years. The costs of investing in
younger generations are not directly proportional to these
generations’ sizes, but a sharp reduction in births means
that there is no excuse for inadequate investment in edu-
cation, health and the other services vital to both individ-
ual and societal development.
 
In the Baltic and western CIS countries, more parents were
separating following the outset of economic and political
reforms, and this affected an increasing number of children.
The initial big rise in family break-up in these countries
may have resulted from an interplay of many factors,
including social stress, changes in life styles and values and
newly streamlined divorce procedures.
The pattern seen in the other sub-regions – an initial
fall followed by rises or a steady trend – is perhaps more in
line with the behaviour one might expect during periods of
falling employment and incomes. One hypothesis is that,
by pulling together, families can offset the negative impacts
of macroeconomic stabilization, but, because families lack
access to adequate services and structures to support them-
selves, the related stress eventually takes its toll in the form
of divorce.
 
Most of the findings of this Report are in the chapters that
follow. But four main conclusions emerge from the intro-
duction given in this chapter.
First, current economic trends and progress in eco-
nomic reform imply that the next 10 years should see sig-
nificant growth in national income in Central and Eastern
Europe and the CIS, albeit with marked differences in
extent from country to country. This is a much more
favourable environment in which to achieve social progress
than were the conditions that typified much of the past
decade. But harnessing that growth for everyone’s benefit is
a challenge that will need to be confronted if it is to help
reverse the setbacks in many dimensions of living standards
that took place in the 1990s.
Second, there is great variation across the region in
economic and institutional capacity and hence in what the
state can achieve in its contribution to promote human
development, alongside that of the private sector. Poorer
countries may want to pay particular attention to ensuring
access to basic social services. At the other end of the spec-
trum, many richer countries are making efforts to harmonize
their institutions in line with the requirements for entry to
Hence when cohabitation increases, the incidence of
divorce may fall. However, the ratio of divorces to new
marriages has in general increased, suggesting that the
probability that a marriage will lead to divorce has typically
risen. (The Caucasus and parts of Central Asia are excep-
tions to this trend – see Statistical Annex, Table 5.5).
Figure 1.20 investigates the number of children
newly affected by divorce by showing the percentage of all
children who have parents who divorce during the year.
Pre-transition, children in the western CIS and the Baltic
states faced a much higher risk of their parents divorcing
than did children in Central or South-Eastern Europe and
a risk some eight to nine times higher than that in Central
Asia. An annual rate of 12 per 1,000 implies that one child
in every five will see his or her parents divorce by the time
he or she reaches adulthood.
The trends in the sub-regions differ over the 1990s.
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